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he Philippines has a long experience in provid-
ing fiscal incentives to favored activities. Even
before it institutionalized the investment incen-
tive system in 1967 with the passing of the first
Omnibus Investment Code (OIC), the government has been
granting fiscal incentives to selected industries that it
deemed, rightly or wrongly, to have large potential positive
impact on the economy. There have been amendments to
the Code since then, starting with the 1970 Export Incen-
tives Act, Batas Pambansa 391 (BP 391) in 1983, and cul-
minating with the 1987 Omnibus Investment Code (under
Executive Order 226). Throughout all these changes, the
major strategy has been, at least until recently, to channel
investments to sectors considered “desirable” in terms of
key objectives. The latter invariably included employment
generation and export promotion.
During the past few years, however, the strategy seems to
have shifted more to “attracting” investments. And while
the objectives of employment generation and export promo-
tion are still there, they appear to be considered more as
expected results (side effects) of attracting investments. At
a glance, such a strategy appears to be less intervention-
ist. However, there are serious implications not readily rec-
ognized that need to be examined. First is on the ideal role
of fiscal incentives. And second is on government revenues.
The investment incentive system: a revisit
Basic principle: correcting for market failures
As a general rule, the basic principle is that government
should intervene only where the market fails. The well-known
examples are the cases of public goods like national de-
fense, merit goods like education and health, equity objec-
tives, incomplete markets (imperfect capital market) and
externalities (activities of individuals with external impacts
to society). And even in these cases of market failures, the
government, because of its limited resources, should al-
ways evaluate (1) how it could intervene with the least cost
and best results, and (2) if, given the cost, it should inter-
vene at all.
The investment incentive system attempts to influence where
investments should go through the granting of fiscal incen-
tives and the listing of priority areas eligible for said fiscal
incentives. It is thus undoubtedly a form of (selective) gov-
ernment intervention. As such, the same underlying prin-
ciple should apply. There should be some market failure
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that the government is trying to address. Indeed, there could
be various market failures and distortions that prevent the
optimal allocation of investment to occur, thereby prevent-
ing the industrial sector to assume its natural role as the
leading sector in the development process. The investment
incentive system therefore is ideally one measure to help
the industrial sector realize its potential.
Its use as an industrial policy tool
There is indeed a role for fiscal incentives as an industrial
policy tool, arising from the existence of market failures,
e.g., those involving externalities and market distortions. In
general, the effect of these externalities and market distor-
tions is to make certain activities less financially profitable
than they actually are from the point of view of society. There
is therefore justification for granting fiscal incentives—to
make socially profitable activities financially profitable as well.
Numerous arguments have been raised, however, regard-
ing the manner of identifying such cases and the effective-
ness of such a “selective” approach. This explains the prac-
ticality of focusing fiscal incentives on exports. The  chal-
lenge is in choosing an activity regardless of export orienta-
tion but with large potential benefits to society. Hence, we
are back to the difficulty of “picking winners.” And while
there is a lot of questions here, if done right, there are also
potential gains.
Objective: not to induce more investment per se
The potential benefits of the fiscal incentive system arise
from directing investment to “desirable” sectors. There is
no presumption that benefits accrue because fiscal incen-
tives would encourage more investments. Indeed, the ob-
jective of granting fiscal incentives is not to induce more
investment per se. Increasing the level of savings (and thus
the level of investment) is primarily the task of the overall
fiscal and monetary policy. Of course, this refers only to
domestic investment and temporarily sets aside the ques-
tion of attracting more foreign investment which will be dis-
cussed later.
As noted, the level of domestic savings and domestic in-
vestment is influenced by fiscal and monetary policy such
as the overall tax rate, corporate income tax, and other gen-
eral fiscal measures, not by the fiscal incentive system. The
investment would therefore have happened as well even
without said fiscal incentive, perhaps in another activity not
encouraged by the fiscal incentive system or maybe even in
the same activity. Thus, there are real fiscal costs involved
in terms of forgone revenues. That is, whatever fiscal incen-
tives are granted, the tax concessions (revenue forgone)
are real “budgetary” costs to the government and should
be justified by corresponding benefits. A rational government
would therefore compare the benefits from granting these
fiscal incentives vis-à-vis other government expenditures.
The role of fiscal incentives in attracting foreign investment
The above discussion disregards the question of attracting
foreign investment with fiscal incentives. Indeed, new for-
eign investment represents a net increase in available sav-
ing that would lead to higher output and growth. Thus, policy
pronouncements regarding the need for fiscal incentives to
be competitive with other countries are not entirely surprising.
The expectation is that competitive fiscal incentives could be
used to raise total investment by attracting foreign investors.
Such view has of course been subject to question. Studies
suggest that the fiscal incentive system is not a very impor-
tant factor in a firm’s decision to locate in a certain country.
A good overall climate for investment, both domestic and
foreign, and an expectation of stability and consistency in
the economic policy regime can actually be of greater impor-
tance than tax exemptions and credits, particularly in at-
tracting the kinds of investments that would be desirable
and lasting (Aldaba 1996). Nonetheless, fiscal incentives
remain to be a means of attracting foreign direct invest-
ments.
Fiscal incentives cost
Still, the bottom line is: fiscal incentives are not costless.
They are forgone revenues. And if we accept the fact that a
lot of these investments would have been invested anyway
(maybe to a different set of activities in the absence of
fiscal incentives), then these costs are very real.
The problem is that these costs are hidden costs, there
being no outright payments involved. This makes fiscal costs
difficult to estimate, especially considering that there are
no robust data on investments—how much of these are
registered with the Board of Investments (BOI) and how these
investments are actually performing. Nonetheless, an at-
tempt is made here to at least come up with some ballparkNo. 2002-18 3
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figures to give us an idea (however rough) on what we are
actually “spending” in the granting of these incentives, at
least for income tax holiday (ITH).1 In the process, some
heroic assumptions would be made, hopefully with clear
indications of the direction of the bias involved.2
Three sets of assumptions are made that yield three levels
of estimates of forgone revenues, namely: (1) a high esti-
mate of forgone revenues from ITH, (2) an intermediate es-
timate, and (3) a low estimate (not necessarily a lower
bound). For all three estimates, there were three common
assumptions.
One is that the return on investment (inclusive of tax) is 15
percent. This is based on the cut-off rate being used by the
Investment Coordination Council in its evaluation of projects.
While this may be too high, the estimates, however, are
simply meant to be indicative and adjustments could easily
be made by the reader to suit his own purpose. The higher
the estimate is, the higher the forgone revenue implied is.
One thing to keep in mind, however, is the question of why
the government should reward unprofitable activities, un-
less there are clear externalities involved.
Two is that the realization rate of project proposals approved
by the BOI is assumed to be 75 percent. And though again
this may be too high, the BOI estimate showed that, in the
case of incentives granting tax and duty free importation of
capital, the actual availment was around 80 percent of that
expected from project proposals. As such, the 75 percent
rate is not unreasonable although adjustments could easily
be made if this assumed rate is proven to be too high (or
low). And three is that the average period of availment is
five years.
In addition to the above common assumptions, there are
also assumptions specific to the level of estimates. For the
high estimate, the additional assumption is that investments
would have been made anyway, even if in different activi-
__________
1No attempt here is made to estimate revenues forgone from
tax and duty free importation of capital as these incentives have
expired. Moreover, the estimate on ITH alone already clearly in-
dicates the magnitude of  the cost of fiscal incentives.
2Hopefully, the errors involved in the simplification would
also tend to cancel each other out.
ties. Thus, the forgone revenues are real costs since in-
vestment was only diverted from an activity that would have
paid income tax to one that would not.
For the intermediate estimate, the assumption is that half
of the foreign investment is lured by fiscal incentives, so
that there would be no forgone revenues for these invest-
ments. And for the third set (low) of assumption, it is as-
sumed that all foreign investments came in because of fis-
cal incentives, so that there are no forgone revenues for
foreign investment. This is probably an extreme assump-
tion (just as some would consider the assumption that all
domestic investments would have been made anyway albeit
in different activities). Again, these estimates are not meant
to be absolute. Table 1 summarizes the estimated costs.
The estimates are disturbingly high—from a low of PhP10.6
billion to a high of PhP18.5 billion, considering that the col-
lected revenues from corporate income tax for year 2000
amounted only to around PhP44.8 billion. It is difficult to
judge if this really indicates how prevalent fiscal incentives
are because of the absence of actual figures on investment.
Nonetheless, this provides a clear indication that the for-
gone revenues are not minimal. And if these costs are not
matched by corresponding benefits to society, then the im-
plications are grave. Indeed, a worse case scenario is one
where the Investment Priorities Plan (IPP) is promoting the
wrong set of activities.
Based on actual availment of incentives, the BOI recorded
around PhP4.2 billion from income tax holiday. Some in-
sights could be gleaned from such a big gap between this
actual availment figure from BOI and the estimates presented
here. It could imply that the realization of investments for
approved BOI projects is much lower than 75 percent (pos-
sibly only 30 percent), or the rate of return on investment
for these BOI projects is much lower than 15 percent (pos-
Table 1. Estimates of forgone revenues per level
of estimates (In million pesos)
Year High Intermediate Low
2000 15,645.63 13,108.15 10,570.66
1999 18,536.92 15,407.42 12,277.934 December 2002
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sibly as low as only 6 percent), or most likely, some combi-
nation of both. In any case, if it were the former (low realiza-
tion rate), then BOI should improve its follow-up and moni-
toring of approved cases and determine where the prob-
lems are. If it were the second (low return), then it raises
more doubts on the benefits of the fiscal incentive system.
Lack of data about the actual firms’ performance and sig-
nificance had limited our findings to this broad interpreta-
tion of results. Estimating the revenue forgone is just one
side of the equation. The next step is to find out if this cost
is worth the benefits. This is even more difficult to esti-
mate. We can only infer some insights from looking at the
type and nature of firms registered with the BOI. The nature
and product of the firm would also give an idea about whether
the activity yields some externality (extra benefits to soci-
ety, outside costs and benefits internal to the firm) that
could provide a justification for its eligibility to receive fiscal
incentives. For example, the fact that most of the investments
made are domestic suggests that most likely, these are not
additional investments encouraged by fiscal incentives.
Implications for reforms in the investment
incentives system
Objective for reforms: transform the OIC to suit its ideal role
Three major points come out from this revisit. One is that
fiscal incentives do have costs. Two, such costs must be
compensated by net benefits to society. And three, errors
could mean huge losses (from the forgone revenue and the
net losses from the activity itself). Such potential losses
would occur if the OIC is not performing its role. Hence, the
major objective for reforms should be to transform the BOI
and the investment system into one that would fit its ideal
role in industrial policy better—that of correcting for market
failures and distortions, and performing real industrial pro-
motion. Another objective is to set up a system that would
minimize mistakes and losses from these mistakes. These
considerations would not only help to maximize benefits from
tax concessions but also ensure that the system would not,
in effect, pose undue burden on our fiscal system.
What needs to be done?
A necessary step towards this end is to limit the number of
preferred areas in the IPP to, say, only 3-5 focused areas at
a time because:
! By nature, the investment incentive system is selec-
tive. Without IPP or with numerous areas in the IPP,  the
implied industrial policy has no clear focus and will re-
sult in a dilution of industrial promotion.
! This is necessary to limit the probability of making mis-
takes (wrong choice of activities that are granted incen-
tives). A short list will make the BOI more careful and
judicious. It will also more likely help the BOI come up
with sectors with extra and real benefits to society. In
addition, should a mistake be made, the magnitude of
losses will be limited.
Again, fiscal incentives have costs. And the wider the IPP
areas are, the greater is the probability of making mistakes,
thereby also increasing the possible welfare losses (from
increased tax concessions coupled with lower benefits to
society brought by these concessions).
The preferred list should necessarily pass a clear set of
criteria. There should also be a provision that incentives will
be available only for a definite and specified period of time.
The definite time period is an extra precaution and should
not be too long. It will also help ensure that the activities
would become viable on their own and will result in a greater
number of areas covered over time.
Finally, limiting the IPP to a short list would help reorient the
thinking of the BOI away from looking at fiscal incentives
simply as a means to “increase investments.” While a case
could be made in this regard with respect to foreign direct
investments (FDI), such is not the case for domestic sav-
ings and investments, the level of which is determined by
the overall fiscal and monetary policy. Again, if the objective
is mainly to increase domestic investments, reforms in in-
vestment incentives should then be made universal, e.g., a
universal corporate income tax reform.  ! ! ! ! !
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